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ABSTRACT
Extreme weather resilience has been defined as being based on three
pillars: resistance (the ability to lower impacts), recovery (the ability to
bounce back), and adaptive capacity (the ability to learn and
improve). These resilience pillars are important both before and
after the occurrence of extreme weather events. Extreme weather
insurance can influence these pillars of resilience depending on
how particular insurance mechanisms are structured. We explore
how the lessons learnt from the current best insurance practices
can improve resilience to extreme weather events. We employ an
extensive inventory of private property and agricultural crop
insurance mechanisms to conduct a multi-criteria analysis of
insurance market outcomes. We draw conclusions regarding the
patterns in the best practice from six European countries to
increase resilience. We suggest that requirements to buy a bundle
extreme weather event insurance with general insurance packages
are strengthened and supported with structures to financing losses
through public-private partnerships. Moreover, support for low
income households through income vouchers could be provided.
Similarly, for the agricultural sector we propose moving towards
comprehensive crop yield insurance linked to general agricultural
subsidies. In both cases a nationally representative body can
coordinate the various stakeholders into acting in concert.
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Extreme weather events can have large impacts on society. For example, in 2016 a com-
bination of flash floods and storms in Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland inflicted $2.2
billion in losses. Similarly, across central Europe a hail storm led to $1.9 billion in
damage (Munich Re, 2017). About 50% of these costs were absorbed by insurers.
However, this is not always the case. There can be limits to insurance, as can be seen
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when insurers leave markets or restrict coverage (Cremades et al., 2018). A sufficiently resi-
lient society can limit these impacts, as resilience is a proactive and forward-looking
concept. While there is no commonly accepted definition of resilience, resilience can
build upon three pillars: resistance, recovery, and adaptive capacity (Thieken, Mariani,
Longfield, & Vanneuville, 2014). Resistance is the ability to limit disaster impacts. Recovery
relates to the time needed to return to the pre-disaster state. Adaptive capacity refers to
the ability to be better prepared for future disasters.
There are several strategies for improving the resistance and recovery pillars. These
strategies can be broadly grouped into prevention, mitigation, and risk-transfer. Preven-
tion measures are put in place to prevent damage from certain extreme weather events
from occurring. One example of such a measure is a dike (Aerts, Botzen, De Moel, &
Bowman, 2013). Mitigation actions limit damage when an event occurs, for example, build-
ing codes (Burby, 2001) or property-level measures (Kreibich, Thieken, Petrow, Müller, &
Merz, 2005) that reduce the susceptibility to damage. Risk-transfer strategies, on the
other hand, do not decrease the direct impacts from an event. Instead, they allow
financial reserves to be developed in order to aid recovery, thereby helping people get
back on their feet (Botzen, 2013). Additionally, as prevention and mitigation cannot
prevent all of the potential impacts of extreme weather events, risk-transfer helps
society to manage the remaining risk, if risk-transfer and mitigation are sufficiently
linked, allowing for proactive risk management.
Proactive risk management is required to minimise current and future extreme weather
impacts. The Sendai framework for disaster risk reduction for the period 2015–2030 prior-
itises developing societal resilience through the use of measures that finance recovery
costs while incentivising risk reduction (Mysiak, Surminski, Thieken, Mechler, & Aerts,
2016). Insurance, the prime example of risk-transfer, fills these roles by providing compen-
sation after an extreme weather event, while acting as a potential price signal of risk. A
strong price signal provides an incentive for active policyholder-level risk management.
Additionally, insurance regulations or requirements can enforce a certain low level of vul-
nerability before potential policyholders can be insured. Finally, a functioning insurance
sector can aggregate and disseminate information before and after disasters.
However, despite the potential for insurance to act as a transformative strategy for
meeting the objectives of the Sendai framework and adapting to climate change, the
role of insurance is viewed differently across stakeholders, depending on their level of
risk and cultural context. Acknowledging the importance of local context is important,
as it shows that there is not a one-size-fits-all solution – what might be acceptable in
one region may not be in another, leading to the idiosyncratic development of insurance
markets (Surminski et al., 2015). These differences can allow for a range of structures and
outcomes that can be studied, and potential patterns in success factors and common out-
comes can be identified.
To this end, we conducted a comparative study of private property and agricultural
insurance in 12 different countries for a range of extreme weather events. The objective
was to identify best practice in order to draw conclusions about improving extreme
weather resilience, which can inform future policy directions across Europe. For private
property insurance, we investigated floods (pluvial, fluvial, and coastal), hail, and wind-
storms, and for the agricultural insurance sector, we also included droughts.1 We devel-
oped a holistic evaluation framework based on a multi-criteria analysis (MCA) in order
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to judge best practice holistically across extreme weather events and five key outcomes:
insurance penetration rates, risk-signalling and risk-reduction incentives, insurance afford-
ability and availability, the speed and certainty of payments, and insurer solvency. These
outcomes were determined by a review of the literature and stakeholder engagement.
Moreover, we assumed the presence of three different risk management objectives: pro-
viding high degrees of coverage and affordability; balancing the different objectives of rel-
evant stakeholders; and the ability of insurance to act as a risk management mechanism.
One novel way that we extend the current literature is by collecting and reporting new
information on the functioning of insurance markets for extreme weather risks in Europe
holistically across multiple hazards, rather than focussing on a single risk, as is common in
the academic literature, e.g. Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther (2011), Hudson, Botzen, Feyen,
and Aerts (2016) or Unterberger, Hudson, Botzen, Schroeer, and Steininger (2019). On the
basis of this data collection, we draw conclusions about best practices for Europe that can
be used to enhance the flood resilience of European households. Additionally, our study
extends the nascent literature investigating insurance mechanisms via MCA. For example,
Hochrainer-Stigler and Lorant (2018) who presented an MCA of potential reforms to the
European Union Solidarity Fund or Unterberger et al. (2019) who study potential
reforms to the Austria Catastrophe Fund. We develop this limited literature by presenting
an MCA framework and data collection approach that was used to study a range of
extreme weather events across varying contexts within 12 European countries, across
two insurance sectors.
In conducting the MCA, we identified Denmark, France, Spain, and the UK as exemplars
of best practice for private property insurance, while for the agriculture sector the exem-
plars were Austria, Spain, and Sweden. Across both sectors we find that, despite the
differing development trajectories for insurance markets, the best practice cases display
similar patterns of behaviour even if the implementation differed in practice. Therefore,
our results indicate a set of market features that improve flood resilience if applied to
less well-performing markets. Moreover, the relatively low scores achieved in the MCA
indicate that there is room for improvement in how Europe uses insurance to boost
flood resilience, by focusing more on the resistance and adaptive capacity-boosting
elements of resilience.
Finally, the suggested series of policy recommendations for increasing resilience has
features similar to those of the reforms for the National Flood Insurance Program in the
United States as proposed, for example, by Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther (2011). This
demonstrates the overall generalizability of both these results and policy directions at
the global level regarding how insurance could move forwards.
2. Methodology
2.1. The interaction of insurance and resilience
The traditional role of insurance is focused upon enhancing the recovery pillar of resili-
ence, with insurance providing financial protection against extreme weather events. Insur-
ance coverage replaces a randomly occurring large loss with a smaller fixed cost, which is
welfare enhancing for risk-averse individuals (Mas-Colell, 1995). The rapid provision of
compensation payments is especially important in the wake of large events. For
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example, the 2002 flood in Germany caused an average loss of €58,000, while the 2013/
2014 winter flooding in the UK inflicted an average loss of €35,000 (Chatterton et al.,
2016). Such amounts can be beyond the means of those affected to be able recover
from the disaster in a timely manner. The provision of secure compensation limits the
long-run negative impacts of a slower recovery (Botzen, 2013; Schäfer, Warner, & Kreft,
2019). Therefore, sufficient insurance coverage improves the recovery pillar by increasing
and diversifying the policyholder’s recovery capacity.
Concerning the resistance pillar, insurance can also play a role in proactively limiting
impacts before extreme weather events occur (Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2009). One
such avenue is the provision of direct incentives for policyholder risk reduction. For
example, by allowing premiums to reflect the underlying risk, policyholders can be pro-
vided with premium discounts if they implement risk-reducing measures (Hudson et al.,
2016; Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2013). The second is in setting minimum requirements
in order to be insured, such as meeting building code regulations, which has been success-
ful in the USA (Burby, 2001).
The final pillar is adaptive capacity. A functioning insurance market can contribute
towards creating a more adaptively capable society by acting as an information generation
and dissemination platform. For example, insurers require diverse portfolios of policy-
holders who undertake different strategies for extreme weather event risk management.
The insurer is in a position to aggregate these experiences and see which measures are
more likely to be successful and can share this information with policyholders. Addition-
ally, a functional insurance market can facilitate adaptive capacity, as the various risk man-
agement stakeholders contribute different areas of expertise. This combination of
expertise creates a more detailed understanding of where and how the disaster impacts
materialise, which would not be available if stakeholders were not encouraged to act in
concert.
2.2. Case study selection
This section is a select summary of the characteristics of insurance mechanisms, the details
of which we reported in our report published by the European Comission (2017), which
contains the underlying data and inventory of insurance mechanisms. In that report, we
used the inventory proposed in Paudel et al. (2012) as a baseline for data collection.
The table and adapted definitions from the underlying report are presented in Appendix
2. We reviewed the academic and grey literature to fill in the requirements of the inven-
tory. An initial literature search was conducted for the European Union. The final 12 case
studies shown in Figure 1(a) were selected based on data availability, quality, and consist-
ency for the studied insurance markets. Following this selection, relevant local stake-
holders (e.g. national insurance associations) were approached to assess the validity of
this information and adjust and update it as required.
Figure 1(b and c) provide examples of the information uncovered. They highlight the
degree to which the public and private sectors collaborate with regard to extreme
weather insurance. The information indicates that the majority of extreme weather insur-
ance is provided by the private market. The remainder of the extreme weather insurance is
provided through a combination of public-private partnerships. These public-private part-
nerships can vary in scope across countries. For example, the French partnership covers a
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large range of extreme weather events, while the UK partnership is focused upon flooding.
However, there is no country that relies solely on publicly provided insurance, even though
public compensation schemes exist.
In terms of provision, in the private property sector wind and hail storms are generally
covered as part of household insurance policies. Flooding coverage tends to be voluntary,
which is associated with low coverage rates. In the agricultural insurance sector, the event
most commonly protected against is hail.
2.3. Extreme weather event insurance assessment criteria
Functional extreme weather event insurance markets must meet conditions of actuarial
and economic insurability (Charpentier, 2008). Actuarial insurability can be defined as con-
sisting of random quantifiable events with losses being relatively uncorrelated across pol-
icyholders. Economic insurability requires the absence of major information asymmetries
between market agents and that there be sufficient overlap between the consumers’ will-
ingness to pay for insurance and the offered premiums. However, meeting these con-
ditions is not sufficient to determine best practice, as meeting the insurability
conditions produces a range of trade-offs. For instance, there is a known trade-off
between the incentive for risk reduction and the affordability of premiums. Additionally,
the importance of these trade-offs differs across stakeholders and their objectives
within the public policy process (Surminski, 2018).
Insurance market outcomes should be evaluated within their wider contexts. We base
the best practice benchmarks on a set of criteria drawn from risk management objectives
for insurance from the academic and grey literature, for example, which is detailed in
Appendix 1: Golnaraghi, Surminski, and Schanz (2017), Kunreuther (2017), Surminski
(2018), The Geneva Association (2018). Additionally, during the completion of our report
we consulted expert stakeholders from the insurance industry and academia via three
project workshops/events, a series of email/telephone interviews, and a review of the
public consultation responses to the European Commission Green Paper on the Insurance
of Natural and Man-made Disasters. This process highlighted the importance of the follow-
ing outcomes: the overall penetration rate across extreme weather events, risk signalling
or risk reduction ability, the ability to absorb large losses, the ability to provide quick and
certain compensation, and the overall affordability and availability of insurance. See
Appendix 1 for details.
Figure 1. Selected European case study countries, noted in dark blue.
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2.4. Extreme weather event insurance evaluation criteria
For each of the criteria, a market sector is awarded points according to Table 1. Moreover,
while the core evaluation criteria are the same across both investigated sectors, the criteria
are operationalised differently. The criteria presented in Table 1 were presented twice to
groups of stakeholders in order to receive feedback on the overall suitability of the points
scoring system. The stakeholders broadly accepted the scoring system, with minor sugges-
tions for use in the developed MCA framework. Appendix 2 provides a more detailed
description of the points scoring system.
The MCA expresses a sector’s performance with a single overall score, while allowing
each outcome to be taken into account according to its perceived importance. This is
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The weights are based on one of three scenarios (see Table 2): Weighting Scheme 1: Pro-
viding high degrees of coverage and affordability; Weighting Scheme 2: Balancing the
different objectives of relevant stakeholders; and Weighting Scheme 3: The ability of insur-
ance to act as a risk management mechanism.
Weighting Scheme 2 was developed based on input received from a series of stake-
holder questionnaires (see Appendix 1). One aspect of these questionnaires was to ask
the respondent to rank the five criteria in terms of their importance. However, the
responses yielded similar weights, as most completed responses were provided by
insurers and academics, which limited the scheme’s overall representativeness. Weighting
Schemes 1 and 3 were developed based on the judgement of the research team in order
to accommodate the different risk management objectives that were retrieved from the
literature review and stakeholder engagement process.
As an illustration, take Spanish private property insurance. For Criterion 1, the median
insurance penetration rate was ∼90%, which scores 4 points. For Criterion 2, the sector
relies on small deductibles with flat rate premiums, which earns 1 point (if risk-based pre-
miums were used, Spain would have scored 3 points). For Criterion 4a, all the relevant
hazards are covered by the Spanish insurance system, scoring 3 points. For Criterion 4b,
due to the income distribution and the average property insurance premium the rate of
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Table 1. Scoring metric the private property insurance sector.
Private property insurance Agriculture (crop) insurance
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unaffordability earns Spain a score of 0 points. Therefore, for Criterion 4 Spain has a total
score of 3 points. Finally, regarding the speed of certainty and payments, Spain has formal
systems with clear rules and no ad hoc payments, with the common usage of professional
loss adjusters, resulting in 3 points. Overall, once standardised Spain has a score of about
0.78 when Weighting Scheme 1 is employed and 0.48 when Weighting Scheme 3 is used.
A country is declared to exemplify best practice if it was ranked first or second under
either of the ranking methods for a given ranking scheme. We then conducted a qualitat-
ive analysis of the identified market sectors to see what lessons can be drawn by detecting
common behavioural patterns.
3. Results and discussion
Figure 2 presents the MCA outcome by highlighting the best practice cases. See Appendix
3 for a more detailed description. It must be noted that, due to our methodological
approach, this analysis is conducted from a policymaker perspective.
Table 3 presents a summary of the common features of the examples of best practice,
which can help to identify ways to enhance societal extreme weather resilience. However,
while a comparative analysis reveals general patterns which should be tailored to meet
specific local conditions, the general patterns reveal a starting point. While this study is
focused on Europe and draws lessons mainly from the practices within Europe, countries
Table 2. Selected weighting schemes used.
Weighting scheme 1 Weighting scheme 2 Weighting scheme 3
Insurance penetration rate 0.35 0.23 0.125
Risk signalling 0 0.22 0.5
Ability to absorb large losses 0.15 0.19 0.125
Affordability and availability 0.35 0.19 0.125
Quick and certain compensation 0.15 0.18 0.125
Figure 2. Countries in yellow are ranked as first or second out of the countries studied for at least one
of the three weighting schemes.
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outside of Europe may also score highly in the MCA. For example, Australia displays many
of the characteristics mentioned in Table 3, such as risk-based premiums and multi-peril
coverage across a range of natural hazard insurance (Mcaneney, Mcaneney, Musulin,
Walker, & Crompton, 2016).
An overview of the MCA results reveals the importance of flooding in driving the MCA
results, as compared to windstorm or hail risks. Flooding is problematic because floods are
highly localised, which limits the ease with which losses can be spread geographically and
mutualised, in contrast to more spatially diverse hazards such as windstorms or hail. Overall,
the average MCA score is highest under Weighting Scheme 1 and lowest under Weighting
Scheme 3. Additionally, the standard deviation of the MCA scores fell moving from
Scheme 1 to Scheme 3, indicating smaller differences in overall performance across countries.
This indicates that, on the whole, the case studies are relatively successful at providing insur-
ance as a social good. For private property insurance, the twomain (and interconnected) pro-
blems toovercomeare insuringfloodingandencouraginghouseholds tobuy insurance. This is
due to the low rates of coverage outside of the best practice countries studied.
3.1. Resistance
3.1.1. Outcome of the MCA
The MCA results indicate that all 12 case studies score low regarding risk reduction, which is
especially highlighted when the average score under Weighting Scheme 1 is compared to
thatunderWeightingScheme3.Moreover, the standarddeviationof scores falls fromWeight-
ing Scheme 1 to Scheme3, indicating amore similar performance of countries aswe focus on
risk reduction or resistance-building aspects. Therefore, even in terms of the countries ident-
ified as exemplars of best practice, the resistance link is weak regarding how insurance and
resilience are linked. Moreover, previous research has also established that is difficult to
find insurance schemes that are successful at promoting risk reduction (Linnerooth-Bayer,
Surminski, Bouwer, Noy, & Mechler, 2019; Surminski & Oramas-Dorta, 2014). This implies
that the countries isolated as best practice are not isolated due to their resistance improving
ability, but rather because they over-performed on the other criteria.
Denmark and the UK are identified as exemplars of best practice for private property
insurance under Weighting Scheme 3 due to their general use of risk-based premiums,
use of deductibles and a number of adaptation initiatives. French insurers are legally
required to include a deductible starting at €380 and rising to €3,050 in line with the occur-
rence of floods. In these countries, the main source for providing resistance is the govern-
ment rather than the policyholder. For example, in France local governments generate risk
Table 3. Summary of common features in the insurance markets studied.
Private property Agriculture
Multiple extreme weather events are combined in a single policy. The use of multi-risk, or yield, insurance.
The purchase of extreme weather event insurance is connected to a far
more commonly required and enforced product.
All cultivated land must be insured.
Collaboration between public and private sector with a commonly
stated and understood objective.
Premium subsidies direct investment to multi-risk
policies.
Provision of a national pool or public reinsurance/support for
catastrophic losses in addition to private reinsurance coverage.
Pool like structures or public reinsurance for
systemic risks such as droughts.
A tradition of collaboration between the public
and private sector risk managers.
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prevention plans, which canmandate certain risk reduction activities or requirements to be
enforced in selected areas. However, the extent to which these plans can require risk-
reduction measures is limited in practice (Poussin, Botzen, & Aerts, 2013). Spanish property
insurance also does not provide signals for risk reductionbecause risk reduction is the role of
the government and not the insurer, whose role is to provide affordable insurance, as stated
by the CCS stakeholders interviewed. The agricultural insurance in Spain is also similar, in
that it does not have a strong focus on promoting risk reduction by policyholders. Rather,
these markets as a whole rely on government-provided risk reduction to maintain flood
risk at an insurable level, such as a 1 in 75 year protection standard in the UK.
For agricultural insurance, we see that the best practice countries of Austria and Spain
both employ bonus-malus systems which reward policyholders with a reduction in pre-
miums if insurance claims lie below a certain level and increase premiums if otherwise. Pol-
icyholders are indirectly rewarded for undertaking actions that lower long-run extreme
weather event vulnerability. This approach allows for a certain degree of information
asymmetry between the insurer and the policyholder, as the insurer cannot observe
and evaluate all the actions that a policyholder may take, but it can monitor claims as a
proxy measurement. The Spanish case goes beyond the bonus-malus system by
offering two additional risk-reduction strategies. First, to be insured a farmer must meet
certain pre-set conditions regarding vulnerability to extreme events. Second, premium dis-
counts are given in return for employing risk-reduction measures.
Overall, the case study countries produce low scores in the MCA due to their reliance on
incentives that provide indirect risk management signals such as awareness campaigns
and deductibles. Awareness campaigns attempt to alter risk perceptions to improve the
perceived benefits of implementing risk-reduction measures. For example, the German
stakeholders engaged with during the project provided anecdotal evidence that their
efforts in collaboration with local and federal governments in Germany through the Ele-
mentarschadenskampagne (elemental damage campaign) risk communication campaign
helped to increase the flood insurance penetration rate across Germany.
3.1.2. Implications for policies to improve resilience
As noted in the previous section, the best practice cases identified by the MCA do not
necessarily result in a systematic improvement for the resistance resilience pillar. For
instance, the information campaign that the German stakeholders said was effective has
its limitations as, to the best of our knowledge; a systematic evaluation of the campaign
has not been conducted. Moreover, there are limitations to relying on awareness cam-
paigns, because constant campaigns are required in order to prevent risk perceptions
from declining due to availability biases (i.e. a tendency for experiences to be perceived
as less important the longer ago they occurred). Moreover, the limited academic literature
also displays mixed results. For instance, Osberghaus (2017) finds that in Germany more
educated households are more responsive to flood risk adaption. While not directly
related to risk communication, this finding indicates that there can be a positive response
to education campaigns. Maidl and Buchecker (2015) used survey data to evaluate the
success of a risk communication campaign aimed at increasing flood preparedness.
Their study found that the campaign was able to increase preparedness intentions,
though its success was based upon having a positive view of the material received as
well as possessing a sufficient level of awareness. Rollason, Bracken, Hardy, and Large
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(2018) discuss a risk communication strategy in the UK, finding that these communication
strategies should be tailored to local contexts in order to be successful. Therefore, while
anecdotal evidence suggests that the large-scale risk communication campaign in
Germany has been successful, there should be more efforts to evaluate the success of
such campaigns.
Secondly, we see that the link between insurance and the resistance resilience pillar is
hampered by the reliance on deductibles, particularly when they are small. Deductibles
alone are unlikely to incentivise proactive risk reduction because policyholders need to
correctly understand the amount of their level of extreme weather risk that is not
covered by the insurer before this can act as an incentive to lower risk. Empirical research
has indicated that only large deductibles can act as an incentive for limiting natural disas-
ter risk (Hudson, Botzen, Czajkowski, & Kreibich, 2017) and that more tangible incentives
may be more successful. For example, Mol, Botzen, and Blasch (2018) find, via experiments,
that premium discounts appear successful at encouraging policyholders to invest in flood
damage mitigation measures. On the other hand, it has been noted in Australia that pre-
miums do not provide a strong incentive to boost resistance due to the non-transparency
of risks and premiums (Mcaneney et al., 2016).
Nevertheless, the best practice examples do offer directions for how other insurance
markets could increase the resistance pillar of resilience. The linkages between insurance
and the resistance pillar can be improved by developing a series of more direct mechan-
isms to incentivise risk reduction. Such mechanisms can be layered to offer a different
range of possible incentives, like information provision about risk and effective risk-
reduction measures with premium discounts for implementing these measures. This
was found to be the case in Austria and Spain for crop insurance, as a layering of resistance
boosting mechanisms is an aspect of the best practice examples that can be used across
both private property insurance and crop insurance. The layered incentive arrangement
allows the insurer to signal which measures are known to be effective. Moreover, this
may be achieved while promoting decentralised adaptation through premium discounts,
which should only promote adaptation when adaptation is cost-effective. Secondly,
bonus-malus arrangements may help overcome elements of asymmetric information.
Therefore, it is beneficial to develop a wider portfolio of risk incentivisation mechanisms
in collaboration with a wider range of stakeholders in order to create a suitable environ-
ment. For instance, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in the UK com-
missioned reports looking into what could be suitable low-cost package of measures and
strategies that homeowners can use to limit flood risk (Lamond, Rose, Bhattacharya-Mis, &
Joseph, 2018). This was later further refined through a series of reports for the UK insur-
ance pool Flood Re looking into how their use can be incentivised (Flood Re, 2018) and
which ones are likely to be cost-effective (Lamond et al., 2018). Due to Flood Re often
being criticised for a lack of focus on risk reduction (e.g. Surminski, 2018; Surminski &
Eldridge, 2015), these actions by Flood Re indicate a promising direction for strengthening
the resistance pillar of insurance in the UK. Moreover, in order to be successful at promot-
ing the resistance pillar of resilience these insurance-based incentives should be part of a
wider enabling environment and partnership arrangement, as insurance by itself is insuffi-
cient (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2019; Surminski & Thieken, 2017). However, there tends to
be slow movement in bringing stakeholders together on this topic (see section 3.4.2),
even though multi-sector engagement is required (Kunreuther, 2015).
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Additionally, a concern for the growth of flood risk involves the use of land-use plan-
ning and how governments do not correctly consider how changes in land-use may
impact flood risk (see Mcaneney et al. (2016) or (OECD, 2016)). However, while land-use
planning is not predominantly within the insurance sphere of influence, the identified
best practice countries highlight cases where land-use can still be influenced. For instance,
in the UK, Flood Re prohibits the sale of insurance for buildings in high flood risk zones
constructed after 2008. This is in order to provide an incentive to limit development in
high-risk floodplains in the coming years, due to the common insurance requirements
compelled by UK mortgage conditions. Therefore, while insurance may not be able to
directly influence land-use planning, insurers may be able to steer land-use in a more resi-
lient direction through their insurance requirements.
3.2. Recovery
3.2.1. Outcome of the MCA
The European insurance markets perform best when considered primarily as mechanisms
focusing upon recovery, as seen by the highest MCA scores for Weighting Scheme 1. The
best practice countries achieve high MCA scores because of high penetration rates, com-
prehensive multi-hazard coverage, and mechanisms in place to support large loss events.
This combination of factors allows the insurance markets of France, Spain, and the UK to
be in, overall, a good position to provide clear and secure compensation for private prop-
erty insurance after a flood event. Spain, Austria, and Sweden provide similar arrange-
ments regarding crop insurance. This is due to their use of multi-hazard crop insurance
and a compulsion to insure all farmland rather than selecting only higher risk parcels.
In comparing the features of the three best practice cases in the private property and
crop insurance sectors, we see that in both market sectors the best practice cases bundle
several extreme weather risks into a single policy. However, it is unclear in these cases to
what degree each extreme weather event contributes towards the insurance premium. In
combing several risks together, a greater and more diversified pool of policyholders can be
created. Moreover, these countries tended to have a formal or informal mandate to buy
insurance. For instance, extreme weather insurance is a compulsory extension of
general private property insurance in Spain and France. These two features taken together
increases the ability of the extreme weather insurance markets to display the mutuality
and solidarity needed to function (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2019).
While mandating multi-extreme weather event coverage provides wider access to the
recovery mechanism of insurance, this in turn must be balanced with concerns about
affordability. This trade-off is especially important if there is a wider movement towards
risk-based premiums to provide stronger risk reduction incentives or if voluntary purchase
options are retracted. The Spanish and French cases aim to limit unaffordability by directly
linking the natural hazard premium to a fixed percentage of coverage brought. The Danish
and UK cases are less clear on this topic. Although it is difficult to distinguish which part of
the premium reflects which risk, it is clear that there is a large degree of cross-subsidisation
between higher and lower risk households. However, a key observation regarding afford-
ability is that the main driver, on average, of insurance unaffordability is the buying power
of households rather than the amount of the insurance premiums. For example, the
average rate of unaffordability in Bulgaria is estimated to be 23%, while in Romania the
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rate is 26%, but the annual average premiums are only €90 and €30, respectively (Insur-
ance Europe, 2015).
Finally, in order to support insurers in the wake of large events, the best practice
countries have mechanisms in place that help to maintain solvency. France provides rein-
surance for extreme weather events through a governmentally provided reinsurance facil-
ity, which in turn has an unlimited state guarantee. In the UK, however, private reinsurers
have created the Flood Re pool to share losses between participating insurers, which in
turn has quasi-governmental powers to raise levies to provide a suitable capital base.
3.2.1. Implications for policies to improve resilience
There are several implications of the conclusions drawn regarding how insurance best
practice interacts with the recovery pillar of resilience. In principle, the provision of insur-
ance greatly supports the recovery pillar, because policyholders are no longer solely reliant
on their own resources (i.e. self-insurance) to get back on their feet after an extreme
weather event. However, for this enhancement to be truly embraced and actively
improve the recovery pillar of resilience, insurance coverage must be widespread.
The best practice countries were able to achieve this in both the private property and
crop insurance markets due to a commonly observed effective compulsion to buy a com-
prehensive bundle of extreme weather event insurance. Moreover, in the case of Spain the
potential for access to government compensation funds is only available for those who
have purchased sufficient agricultural insurance coverage. This collection of features
allows relatively rare extreme weather events, such as floods, to be pooled with more
common extreme weather events such as hailstorms, as well as uncorrelated risks, such
as house fires, which are more tangibly important to the policyholder. This combination
of perils allows for improved risk diversification by increasing the range of high and low
risk policyholders. Moreover, broad coverage of a variety of risks gives policyholders a
high degree of certainty in receiving compensation after an extreme weather event
occurs. These structured systems promote a reliance on formally developed and provided
insurance mechanisms rather than ad hoc government support. Furthermore, promoting a
reliance on formal and developed mechanisms promotes a higher level of development of
the recovery resilience pillar because there are predictable expectations rather than
actions based on changing public concerns and pressures. This is because mandated
and comprehensive insurance coverage is more efficient than a system of ex post
public disaster programmes (Kunreuther, 2006).
Therefore, in order to promote increased rates of coverage in the non-best practice
regions of Europe, there could be an increased focus on mandates to buy a complete
bundle of extreme weather event insurance. The development of such a mandate is not
sufficient without enforcement or sufficient incentives for buying insurance. Therefore,
linking multi-hazard insurance with products that a consumer sees as more important
can increase resilience by increasing the opportunity cost of not buying comprehensive
coverage. Private property insurance has a well-developed mechanism that links extreme
weather insurance with mortgage requirements or fire insurance. While a similar obser-
vation was not made for farmers, it was found in the case of Spain that holding sufficient
insurance coverage was a requirement for being able to receive potential compensation
from thegovernment. Therefore, we argue that this approach canbeextended so that insur-
ance coverage is tied to access towider agricultural subsidies (e.g. the CommonAgricultural
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Policy) to increase the opportunity cost of not being insured. These suggestions for moving
insurance forwards are common place in the countries identified among the selected cases
as exemplars of best practice (although not in the worst performing countries) as well as
several other countries in the world. Additionally, the relative salience of the risks of
these events can be improved by making them more tangible, for example, by connecting
the occurrence of flooding to the lifetime of amortgage or a resident’s tenure in their prop-
erty. This, in turn, could lead to a stronger demand for multi-year insurance policies, which
could create a more stable extreme weather insurance demand for insurers, as argued by
Michel-Kerjan, Lemoyne De Forges, and Kunreuther (2012).
The above mechanisms can help boost the recovery pillar resilience and decrease the
difficultly for insurers of insuring localised disasters by increasing currently limited
demand. However, in doing so care must be taken to maintain a degree of clarity about
how the premium is structured and connected to the types of insured extreme weather
risks, to avoid the problems encountered in Australia regarding risk reduction (Mcaneney
et al., 2016).
Not only is the clarity of the premium important, but also, in terms of the social justice
implications when coverage is mandated, its total size. This is because if premiums are
considered unaffordable then the purchaser is considered to be overly burdened by the
purchase (National Research Council, 2015). Unaffordability in the case study countries
is driven, in most cases, by the purchasing powers of households rather than the pre-
miums themselves. However, if premiums are linked to risk, then premiums can
become rapidly unaffordable in high risk areas, unless risk-reduction measures are taken
either by the state, community, or individual. A high rate of unaffordability places
additional burdens on policyholders, which limits their resilience potential. Therefore, as
the results of the MCA indicate that unaffordability cannot be fully corrected from
within the insurance market itself, mechanisms external to the market are required to
support policyholders who would face unaffordable insurance premiums.
A commonly proposed method for addressing this problem is means-tested vouchers
for enabling low-income households in high risk areas to purchase comprehensive insur-
ance (Kousky & Kunreuther, 2014). Such vouchers can address equity concerns by remov-
ing the high premium burden placed on households while potentially allowing for
insurance to have a stronger link to risk reduction. This is because vouchers allow unafford-
ability to be corrected from outside of the insurance market. The same can also hold for
property-level adaptation measures in order to render them more affordable and increase
uptake (Montgomery & Kunreuther, 2018). The voucher mechanism, or similar ones such
as tax credits, allow for insurance to improve two pillars of resilience before and after
extreme weather events. However, such mechanisms for purchasing insurance should
also be time-limited (Kousky & Kunreuther, 2014) in order to avoid an indirect subsidy
for lower-income households to locate in disaster prone areas in order to become eligible
for the voucher. Including these social justice concerns can help to limit social inequalities
that can occur if only certain segments of society can successfully adapt to extreme
weather events.
However, a relevant concern is that in the case of a large event rapid insurance pay-outs
may not be possible due to the assessment and claims process. For instance, this was a
problematic experience after the Christchurch earthquake where, due to the magnitude
of the event, payments were staggered over many years (King, Middleton, Brown,
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Johnston, & Johal, 2014; Potter, Becker, Johnston, & Rossiter, 2015), as well as after Hurri-
cane Katrina (Corey & Deitch, 2011; Green, Bates, & Smyth, 2007). This process can be
further complicated by the presence of both private insurers and public compensation
mechanisms. Therefore, it is important to correctly layer an insurance market so that
those affected by a disaster have a single point of call for claiming assistance. This line
of thought could also support the development of PPPs where the government acts as
a formal reinsurer rather than offering direct compensation to people and thereby
acting as a competitor to primary insurers. Creating such an enabling environment for
facilitating fast payments is important, as Poontirakul, Brown, Seville, Vargo, and Noy
(2017) notes that adequate and prompt payments promote recovery, while slow
payment processes may be no better than receiving no compensation payments at all.
3.3. Adaptive capacity
3.3.1. Outcome of the MCA
There are several ways in which insurance can interact with the concept of adaptive
capacity. The first is the ability of the insurance industry to inform policyholders
through awareness-increasing activities, as discussed in Section 3.1. The second is
through the ability to remain a viable adaptation mechanism moving forwards in light
of increasing natural hazard losses. The best practice cases identified have extensive col-
laboration across stakeholders, which have allowed the insurance arrangements to adapt
to changing situations in a broadly acceptable manner. For example, the Danish Storm
Council is appointed by the Danish Minister for Business and Growth and consists of an
independent chair and eight other members, in order to bring a holistic and collaborative
understanding of risk management topics. These include stakeholders from the insurance
industry, private citizens, municipalities and ministries. The Spanish approach to crop
insurance is based around the Agroseguro entity that handles the entire insurance
process, with the objective of managing agricultural risk as a whole for its stakeholders.
A challenge for transferring these best practices to other countries is that, for the most
part, the institutions are long established. The Austrian Hail Insurance Company was
founded in 1946, Agroseguro was founded in 1978, and the CCS can trace its origins to
1941. The most recently formed organisation is Flood Re in the UK. The introduction of
Flood Re highlights several potential problems surrounding different levels of willingness
to participate between insurers and the government as well as potential legal challenges,
which is described in more detail by Mysiak and Pérez-Blanco (2016) and Surminski (2018).
Taken together, the long tradition of a central body helps create a suitable enabling
environment for insurance markets to operate in. However, such bodies can be very
difficult to create without a suitable catalysing event, such as CATNAT and Flood Re
being founded as a response to serious events. A discussion of the role of catalysing
events is presented by Birkmann et al. (2010).
3.3.2. Implications for policies to improve resilience
While the resistance-improving aspect of the insurance best practice cases is the weakest
aspect that can be formally measured through the MCA, the adaptive capacity elements
are also weak. For instance, there is little evidence regarding the success at increasing resi-
lience of risk communication campaigns. Moreover, the insurance mechanisms studied
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tend to be rather static in terms of their overall structure. This hints that the interaction
between insurance and adaptive capacity is underutilised. This is the case despite the col-
laborative structures in place that provide insurers with suitable support in case of large
disaster events, which otherwise may threaten their solvency. Insolvent insurers would
not be able to provide compensation to those affected. For example, in Spain the CCS
has an equalisation fund financed by retained premiums, and on top of this fund the
CCS can buy private reinsurance coverage and has access to a state guarantee. Similarly,
Flood Re in the UK acts as an insurance pool financed by a surcharge on all insurance pol-
icies sold in the UK, with the ability to impose a second surcharge in case Flood Re’s
resources prove insufficient. These measures improve adaptive capacity by maintaining
insurer solvency regarding high risk households.
Furthermore, the degree of collaboration between the insurance sector stakeholders
and the government can be tailored with respect to formality and extent of the partner-
ship. For instance, in France the public and private sector have a long-standing
cooperation in the French Association for Disaster Risk Reduction. Another example is
the Danish Storm Council. However, regardless of the degree of formality, there is a
stated focus. Therefore, a suitable role for new bodies can in promoting risk reduction.
This is because an external body dedicated to promoting and developing risk reduction
strategies integrated across all relevant stakeholders can facilitate a minimum level of
risk management and insurance viability. This could be achieved by adding a surcharge
to insurance premiums that channels the revenue into a fund or funds for constructing
protection measures, for general adaptation measures, or to subsidise more individual
property-level measures. This fund could be a coordination entity whereby insurers, gov-
ernment agencies, etc. are involved in a not-for-profit manner.
In developing a coordination entity, the specific knowledge and expertise of each stake-
holder can be leveraged to strengthen current weaknesses that a single stakeholder cannot
surmount. For example, insurers can use their expertise to identifywhich adaptationmeasures
lower risk, and a third-party organisation can provide certificates to those who employ these
measures to signal that thesemeasures have been correctly employed. This, in turn, allows the
policyholder to obtain discounts on their insurance premiums or reimbursement for the
measure’s cost. This approach is similar to the elevation certificates offered for the National
Flood Insurance Program in the USA, or the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association’s WPI-
18 certificates, asmentionedbyMcaneney et al. (2016). A singlemanagementbody canorgan-
ise and facilitate such stakeholder collaborations. Moreover, such a body brings together a
range of experiences and capacities that can be used to develop the socially inclusive and
useful risk communication campaigns required for the message to be acted upon.
4. Conclusion
Extreme weather events place a large burden on society due to their potentially disastrous
consequences. Moreover, due to the combination of socio-economic development and
climate change there is a growing threat from extreme weather events. Therefore, societal
resilience against extreme weather events should be promoted and, if well organised and
regulated, insurance is, potentially, a transformative mechanism for resilience.
The current role that extreme weather event insurance plays varies strongly across
Europe, with a great deal of heterogeneity in provision and overall outcomes across
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countries and sectors. A comparison of this diversity can identify what works well and
what does not, with the aim of deriving recommendations for improving the perform-
ance of insurance markets to enhance extreme weather resilience. To conduct our com-
parative study, we used an extensive inventory of insurance markets covering 12
countries for private property and agricultural insurance across a range of extreme
weather events. The comparative analysis identified that, for private property insurance,
Denmark, France, Spain, and the UK represent exemplars of best practice. For the agri-
culture sector best practice exemplars were Austria, Spain, and Sweden.
Based on this analysis, from the policymaker perspective, we suggest a series of ways
in which extreme weather event insurance can increase disaster resilience. For private
property insurance, we suggest introducing a requirement to buy extreme weather
event insurance along with general homeowners’ insurance. Moreover, support for
low income households through means-tested vouchers could be provided. For the
agricultural sector, we propose moving towards comprehensive crop yield insurance
by requiring farmers to buy a sufficiently comprehensive insurance product to be eli-
gible for the general agricultural subsidies farmers receive. In both cases, a nationally
representative body can coordinate the various stakeholders into acting in concert.
This body could be financed by a premium surcharge which is then used to directly
co-finance the employment of cost-effective risk-reduction measures. Moreover, this
public-private collaboration could aim to strengthen the link between insurance and
risk reduction through a combination of measures, including information provision
about risk and mitigation measures, financial incentives like premium discounts and
subsidies, and building codes and zoning regulations. In the long run, improved risk
reduction will result in lower premiums. Additionally, this structure could help to
support the financing of extreme losses to maintain the solvency of the insurance
industry. This suggested series of policy recommendations for boosting resilience is
similar to features of the reforms proposed for the National Flood Insurance Program
in the United States by Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther (2011). This shows the overall
generalisability of these results and policy directions at the global level regarding
how insurance should move forwards to enhance resilience.
Note
1. Please note that earthquakes or other seismic risks, while present in Europe, are not relevant to
this study as it focuses on extreme weather events. Future research can address this gap in the
literature.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This work was supported by Climate Adaption Unit, DG CLIMA, European Comission. Botzen has
recieved support from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) VIDI Grant
(452.14.005) and the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under
grant agreement No 776479.
318 P. HUDSON ET AL.
References
Aerts, J. C. J. H., Botzen, W. J. W., De Moel, H., & Bowman, M. (2013). Cost estimates for flood resi-
lience and protection strategies in New York City. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,
1294, 1–104.
Birkmann, J., Buckle, P., Jaeger, J., Pelling, M., Setiadi, N., Garschagen, M.,… Kropp, J. (2010). Extreme
events and disasters: A window of opportunity for change? Analysis of organizational, institutional
and political changes, formal and informal responses after mega-disasters. Natural Hazards, 55,
637–655.
Botzen, W. J. W. (2013). Managing extreme climate change risks through insurance. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Burby, R. (2001). Flood insurance and floodplain management: The US experience. Global
Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards, 3, 111–122.
Charpentier, A. (2008). Insurability of climate risks. The Geneva Papers, 33, 91–109.
Chatterton, J., Clarke, C., Daly, E., Dawks, S., Elding, C., Fenn, T.,… Salado, R. (2016). The costs and
impacts of the winter 2013 to 2014 floods. Bristol: Environment Agency.
Corey, C. M., & Deitch, E. A. (2011). Factors affecting business recovery immediately after Hurricane
Katrina. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 19, 169–181.
Cremades, R., Surminski, S., Máñez Costa, M., Hudson, P., Shrivastava, P., & Gascoigne, J. (2018).
Using the adaptive cycle in climate-risk insurance to design resilient futures. Nature Climate
Change, 8, 4–7.
European Comission. (2017). Insurance of weather and climate-related disaster risk: Inventory and
analysis of mechanisms to support damage prevention in the EU. In X. Le Den, M. Persson, A.
Benoist, P. Hudson, M. De Ruiter, L. De Ruig, O. Kuik, & W. Botzen (Eds.). Luxembourg:
Publications Office of the European Union.
Flood Re. (2018). Incentivising household action on flooding and options for using incentives to increase
the take up of flood resilience and resistance measures. Author.
The Geneva Association. (2018). Climate change and the insurance industry: Taking action as risk man-
agers and investors perspectives from C-level executives in the insurance industry. Zurich: Author.
Golnaraghi, M., Surminski, S., & Schanz, K. (2017). An intergrated appraoch to managing extreme events
and cliamte risks. Zurich: The Geneva Assocaition.
Green, R., Bates, L. K., & Smyth, A. (2007). Impediments to recovery in New Orleans’ upper and lower
ninth ward: One year after Hurricane Katrina. Disasters, 31, 311–335.
Hochrainer-Stigler, S., & Lorant, A. (2018). Evaluating partnerships to enhance disaster risk manage-
ment using multi-criteria analysis: An application at the Pan-European level. Environmental
Management, 61, 24–33.
Hudson,P., Botzen,W. J.W., Czajkowski, J., & Kreibich,H. (2017).Moral hazard innatural disaster insurance
markets: Empirical evidence from Germany and the United States. Land Economics, 93, 179–208.
Hudson, P., Botzen, W. J. W., Feyen, L., & Aerts, J. C. J. H. (2016). Incentivising flood risk adaptation
through risk based insurance premiums: Trade-offs between affordability and risk reduction.
Ecological Economics, 125, 1–13.
Insurance Europe. (2015). European insurance - key facts. Brussels: Author.
King, A., Middleton, D., Brown, C., Johnston, D., & Johal, S. (2014). Insurance: Its role in recovery from
the 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence. Earthquake Spectra, 30, 475–491.
Kousky, C., & Kunreuther, H. (2014). Addressing affordability in the national flood insurance program.
Journal of Extreme Events, 1, 1450001.
Kreibich, H., Thieken, A. H., Petrow, T., Müller, M., & Merz, B. (2005). Flood loss reduction of private
households due to building precautionary measures- lessons learned from the Elbe flood in
August 2002. Natural Hazards and Earth System Science, 5, 117–126.
Kunreuther, H. (2006). Disaster mitigation and insurance: Learning from Katrina. The ANNALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 604, 208–227.
Kunreuther, H. (2015). The role of insurance in reducing losses from extreme events: The need for
public-private partnerships. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Issues and Practice, 40,
741–762.
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 319
Kunreuther, H. (2017). Encouraging adaptation to flood risk: The role of the national flood insurance
program (Wharton Working Papers). Philadelphia: Wharton, University of Pennsylvania.
Kunreuther, H., & Michel-Kerjan, E. (2009). At war with the weather: Managing large scale risks in a new
era of catastrophes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kunreuther, H., & Michel-Kerjan, E. (2013). Managing catastrophic risks through redesigned insur-
ance: Challenges and opportunities. In G. Dionne (Ed.), Handbook of insurance (pp. 517–546).
New York, NY: Springer New York.
Lamond, J., Rose, C., Bhattacharya-Mis, N., & Joseph, R. (2018). Evidence review for property flood resi-
lience phase 2 report. Bristol: Flood Re and UWE Bristol.
Linnerooth-Bayer, J., Surminski, S., Bouwer, L. M., Noy, I., & Mechler, R. (2019). Insurance as a response
to loss and damage? In R. Mechler, L. M. Bouwer, T. Schinko, S. Surminski, & J. Linnerooth-Bayer
(Eds.), Loss and damage from climate change: Concepts, methods and policy options (pp. 483–
512). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Maidl, E., & Buchecker, M. (2015). Raising risk preparedness by flood risk communication. Natural
Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 15, 1577–1595.
Mas-Colell, A. (1995). Microeconomic theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mcaneney, J., Mcaneney, D., Musulin, R., Walker, G., & Crompton, R. (2016). Government-sponsored
natural disaster insurance pools: A view from down-under. International Journal of Disaster Risk
Reduction, 15, 1–9.
Michel-Kerjan, E., & Kunreuther, H. (2011). Redesigning flood insurance. Science, 333, 408–409.
Michel-Kerjan, E., Lemoyne De Forges, S., & Kunreuther, H. (2012). Policy tenure under the U.S.
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Risk Analysis, 32, 644–658.
Mol, J. M., Botzen, W. J. W., & Blasch, J. E. (2018). Behavioral motivations for self-insurance under
different disaster risk insurance schemes. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.007
Montgomery, M., & Kunreuther, H. (2018). Pricing storm surge risks in Florida: Implications for determin-
ing flood insurance premiums and evaluating mitigation measures. Risk Analysis, 38, 2275–2299.
Munich Re. (2017). Natural catastrophes 2016 Analyses, assessments, position. TOPICS GEO. Munich,
Germany: Author.
Mysiak, J., & Pérez-Blanco, C. D. (2016). Partnerships for disaster risk insurance in the EU. Natural
Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 16, 2403–2419.
Mysiak, J., Surminski, S., Thieken, A., Mechler, R., & Aerts, J. (2016). Brief communication: Sendai frame-
work for disaster risk reduction – success or warning sign for Paris? Natural Hazards and Earth
Systems Science, 16, 2189–2193.
National Research Council. (2015). Affordability of national flood insurance program premiums: Report
1. Washington, DC: National Research Council.
OECD. (2016). Financial management of flood risk. Paris: OECD.
Osberghaus, D. (2017). The effect of flood experience on household mitigation—evidence from
longitudinal and insurance data. Global Environmental Change, 43, 126–136.
Poontirakul, P., Brown, C., Seville, E., Vargo, J., & Noy, I. (2017). Insurance as a double-edged sword:
Quantitative evidence from the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. The Geneva Papers Risk and
Insurance - Issues and Practice, 42, 609–632.
Potter, S. H., Becker, J. S., Johnston, D. M., & Rossiter, K. P. (2015). An overview of the impacts of the
2010–2011 Canterbury earthquakes. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 14, 6–14.
Poussin, J. K., Botzen, W. J. W., & Aerts, J. C. J. H. (2013). Stimulating flood damage mitigation through
insurance: An assessment of the French CatNat system. Environmental Hazards, 12, 258–277.
Rollason, E., Bracken, L. J., Hardy, R. J., & Large, A. R. G. (2018). Rethinking flood risk communication.
Natural Hazards, 92, 1665–1686.
Schäfer, L., Warner, K., & Kreft, S. (2019). Exploring and managing adaptation frontiers with climate
risk insurance. In R. Mechler, L. M. Bouwer, T. Schinko, S. Surminski, & J. Linnerooth-Bayer (Eds.),
Loss and damage from climate change: Concepts, methods and policy options (pp. 317–341).
Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Surminski, S. (2018). Fit for Purpose and Fit for the Future? An Evaluation of the UK’s New Flood
Reinsurance Pool. Risk Management and Insurance Review, 21, 33–72. doi:10.1111/rmir.12093
320 P. HUDSON ET AL.
Surminski, S., Aerts, J. C. J. H., Botzen, W. J. W., Hudson, P., Mysiak, J., & Pérez-Blanco, C. D. (2015).
Reflection on the current debate on how to link flood insurance and disaster risk reduction in
the European Union. Natural Hazards, 79, 1451–1479.
Surminski, S., & Eldridge, J. (2015). Flood insurance in England: An assessment of the current and
newly proposed insurance scheme in the context of rising flood risk. Journal of Flood Risk
Management, 10, 415–435.
Surminski, S., & Oramas-Dorta, D. (2014). Flood insurance schemes and climate adaptation in devel-
oping countries. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 7, 154–164.
Surminski, S., & Thieken, A. (2017). Promoting flood risk reduction: The role of insurance in Germany
and England. Earth’s Future, 5, 979–1001.
Thieken, A. H., Mariani, S., Longfield, S., & Vanneuville, W. (2014). Preface: Flood resilient communities–
managing the consequences of flooding. Natural Hazards and Earth System Science, 14, 33–39.
Unterberger, C., Hudson, P., Botzen, W. J. W., Schroeer, K., & Steininger, K. W. (2019). Future public
sector flood risk and risk sharing arrangements: An assessment for Austria. Ecological
Economics, 156, 153–163.
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 321
